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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Arbitrage is defined as “the nearly simultaneous purchase and sale 
of securities or foreign exchange in different markets in order to profit 
from price discrepancies.”1 However, arbitrage strategies have roots in 
ancient times, when Hammurabi’s Code was law.2 Even at the 
nascence of modern economics, in approximately 1760 B.C., 
arbitrageurs sought to take advantage of money-making 
opportunities.3  
As one might expect, however, trade markets at that time looked 
quite different than they do today—instead of trading securities 
globally with a click of a button in deep, liquid markets at a trade 
institution, “securities” were traded via camel with details of the 
transaction inscribed on stone tablet bills of sales.4 Amazingly, even 
when information travelled literally at a camel’s pace, humans 
exploited risk-created arbitrage opportunities by purchasing goods on 
consignment to offset merchants’ risk of loss over long delivery 
voyages.5 These ancient arbitrageurs then turned a profit on the goods 
in a known higher paying locality based on the information shared in 
the arbitrageurs’ merchant information network: cash-and-carry 
arbitrage.6 
 
 
 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2021, The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz 
College of Law; Master of Business Administration Candidate, 2021, The Ohio 
State University Fisher College of Business. 
1 Arbitrage, MERRRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/arbitrage (last visited Apri. 21, 2019).  
2 Geoffrey Poitras, Arbitrage: Historical Perspectives, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
QUANTITATIVE FIN. 1 (Rama Cont. ed., 2010). 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 2–3.  
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A. Is It Gambling If Arbitrageurs Are Winning?  
 
Ancient and modern arbitrage is, in its most basic and theoretical 
form, well-informed, no-risk capitalization on various markets and 
their respective conditions.7 Innumerous highly profitable arbitrage 
strategies have been developed throughout history and, as is human 
nature, there are always critics of those who engage in such practices. 
However, in recent years, arbitrageurs have deviated from the linchpin 
“no-risk” element of arbitrage in search of high-yield returns in 
markets that do, in fact, include some degree of risk, such as merger 
arbitrage.8  
These risk-related forms of arbitrage have forums that are 
conceptually akin to an opulent horse racing track, an industry that 
generates approximately $11 billion annually in betting revenue, 
where wagering is conducted through a “pari-mutuel” system, 
typically operated “on-track”;9 the arbitrageurs are predominantly 
hedge funds10—the “bettors”—and their difficulty is finding out how 
to arbitrage the system. One of arbitrageurs’ most successful betting 
methods has, in recent history, been appraisal arbitrage,11 which takes 
 
7 Arbitrage, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arbitrage.asp 
(last updated Oct. 22, 2018).  
8 Merger Arbitrage, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mergerarbitrage.asp (last updated Apr. 14, 
2019) (“Merger arbitrage, often considered a hedge fund strategy, involves 
simultaneously purchasing and selling the stocks of two merging companies to 
create ‘riskless’ profits. A merger arbitrageur reviews the probability of a merger 
not closing on time or at all. Because of uncertainty, the stock price of the target 
company typically sells at a price below the acquisition price. The arbitrageur 
purchases the stock before the acquisition with an expectation of making a profit 
when the merger or acquisition is complete.”). 
9 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 3002 (2012) (defining several terms within the meaning 
of the 2000 Amendment of the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1977, including “on-
track wager,” meaning that the wager is placed “at the racetrack,” and “pari-
mutuel,” defined as a system in which “wagers are placed with, or in, a wagering 
pool . . . and in which the participants are wagering with each other and not against 
the operator.”).  
10 Wei Jiang et al., Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J. 
L. & ECON. 697, 706 tbl.1 (2016) (providing that, from 2000-2014, 86 unique 
hedge funds have filed appraisal petitions for 170 different deals, and account for 
73.8% of the aggregate invested capital in target firms, the shares for which 
appraisal is sought, with the second largest amount of invested capital belonging to 
mutual funds, which account for a mere 13.6% of aggregate invested capital).  
11 Id. at 721 tbl.11 (revealing that, in a sample of 101 appraisal petitions that went 
to trial, dating from 2000-2014, the average gross returns—the amount of money 
made, before expenses, represented by a percentage of the original capital 
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place at an unconventional pari-mutuel track—the Delaware Court of 
Chancery.12 Appraisal arbitrage burgeoned out of Delaware’s statutory 
appraisal remedy, provided in response to the effective revocation of 
minority shareholders’ veto rights, necessarily nullified by corporation 
law’s transition away from unanimous shareholder voting 
requirements.13  
The appraisal remedy was legislatively intended to be, in lieu of 
minority shareholders’ veto right, a safeguard against corporate 
majority rule, enabling minority beneficial owners of stock in a target 
firm of a merger to petition the Court of Chancery to determine the 
“fair value,” as opposed to the “deal price,” of such shares.14 
Theoretically, the statute purports to deter surviving firms15 in mergers 
from forcing minority shareholders of a target firm to accept an 
undervalued per-share deal price as a result of the merger.16 However, 
 
investment in a target firm—realized by petitioners was 108.3%. That is, if Hedge 
Fund purchased $100 of shares in Y Corporation, the target firm in a merger deal 
with X Corporation, and perfected appraisal rights, based on the percentage of 
average gross returns taken from the sample of 108.3%, Hedge Fund would realize 
a gain of $108.3 from its $100 invested capital, which is an astronomical 
investment figure.).   
12 Id. at 706 tbl.2 (indicating that, from 2000-2014, 9 different hedge funds have 
been petitioners for 80 challenged deals, accounting for 52.5% of total dollar 
volume of invested capital in target firms).  
13 Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts 
Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 614  (1998) (“The origin of the appraisal 
remedy typically is tied to the move in corporate law to majority approval of 
fundamental corporate changes, and away from a requirement of unanimous 
shareholder consent. When unanimous approval was no longer required, and 
shareholders effectively lost their individual right to veto corporate changes, the 
appraisal remedy was provided . . . .”).  
14 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019) (distinguishing that deal price is the per-
share price offered by surviving firm to the target firm in a merger, whereas fair 
value is determined by the Court of Chancery in an appraisal proceeding—
assuming the petitioner satisfies the prerequisites to initiate such petition—in which 
“the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of” any synergies 
that create value as a result of the announcement or completion of such merger, 
plus “interest, if any.” In making its determination of fair value, the Court must 
“take into account all relevant factors,” which includes deal price as indicia.). 
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(a) (2019) (“Any 2 or more corporations of this 
State may merge into a single surviving corporation, which may be any 1 of the 
constituent corporations or may consolidate into a new resulting corporation 
formed by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of merger or 
consolidation.”). 
16 Wertheimer, supra note 13 (“The origin of the appraisal remedy typically is tied 
to the move in corporate law to majority approval of fundamental corporate 
changes, and away from a requirement of unanimous shareholder consent. When 
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the statute concurrently supports appraisal arbitrage, which ensues 
after the record date of a merger, when arbitrageurs purchase large, 
typically outstanding, blocks of shares in the target firm of the deal,17 
which are held by record holders of stock. Through Delaware’s 
appraisal statute, the wagers placed by arbitrageurs that fair value 
would be in excess of deal price proved to be an excellent arbitrage 
strategy.  
 
B. Perfecting Appraisal Rights Under Section 262: “Standing” 
Requirements 
 
When patrons attend a horse race, there are several prerequisites 
that must be met in order for such patrons to be eligible to place bets: 
the patron must be of legal age;18 the patron must have a ticket enter 
the race in order to be able to place an on-track wager; and, among 
others, that the patron has the requisite amount of money to be able to 
place the desired bet. to be able. Likewise, in order for stockholders,19 
often arbitrageurs, to qualify for an appraisal proceeding before the 
Court of Chancery, various section 262 procedural prerequisites must 
be satisfied.20  
Initially, pursuant to Delaware’s appraisal statute, upon timely 
receipt of notice of a proposed merger from the corporation, 
stockholders of such corporation must, before voting on the merger, 
furnish the corporation with a written demand that reasonably informs 
the corporation of such stockholder’s identity and intent to seek 
appraisal.21 Subsequently, when the corporation holds its shareholder 
vote on the merger, “[a] stockholder only can pursue an appraisal if the 
stockholder ‘neither voted in favor of the merger . . . nor consented 
 
unanimous approval was no longer required, and shareholders effectively lost their 
individual right to veto corporate changes, the appraisal remedy was provided.”).  
17 Scott Callahan, Darius Palia, & Eric Talley, Appraisal Arbitrage and 
Shareholder Value, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 14, 2017), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/12/14/appraisal-arbitrage-and-
shareholder-value.  
18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §4810 (2019). 
19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2019) (“As used in this section, the word 
‘stockholder’ means a holder of record of stock in a stock corporation.”).  
20 See id. § 262(d) (providing procedural requirements for perfecting appraisal 
rights, relating both to the corporation and to the stockholder of such corporation 
that seeks appraisal of such stockholder’s shares).  
21 Id. § 262(d)(1).  
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thereto in writing,’” which the Court of Chancery refers to as the 
“Dissenter Requirement.”22  
Interdependent upon the dissenter requirement is the “Record 
Holder Requirement,” which “dictates that the record holder’s actions 
determine perfection of the right to appraisal.”23 That is, “[t]he 
statute’s requirements are directed to the stockholder—expressly 
defined as the record holder—and whether it has owned the stock at 
the appropriate times, whether it has made a sufficient demand, and 
whether it has voted the shares it seeks to have appraised in favor of 
the merger.”24  
With respect to the eventual litigation stage of the appraisal 
remedy, the dissenter and the record holder requirements have been 
cemented into Delaware courts’ precedent as statutorily interpreted 
cornerstones that capacitate arbitrage; however, the final prerequisite 
to commence appraisal litigation, assuming all antecedent conditions 
of sections 262(a) and (d) have been satisfied, is for either the record 
holder or the beneficial owner of shares for which appraisal is sought 
to file an appraisal petition with the Court of Chancery.25 If all such 
standing requirements have been met, the stockholder “shall be 
entitled to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of 
the stockholder’s shares of stock.”26 
 
C. Appraisal Arbitrage’s Profitable Past and Bleak Future  
 
While there are many commentators who either advocate for, or 
condemn, the use of appraisal arbitrage, this Note does not seek to 
assert a position on the common discussed “good versus evil” appraisal 
arbitrage argument.27 Rather, this Note endeavors to impartially 
 
22 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 21 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
23 Id. at 46.  
24 Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., No. CV 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 67586, 
at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015).  
25 See id. at *6 n.49 (“[A]lthough procedurally a beneficial owner may now initiate 
the legal action, its substantive right to appraisal is still dependent on whether the 
record holder has perfected appraisal according to Section 262(a).”); see also DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e) (providing beneficial owners of shares for which 
appraisal is sought the ability to file, independent of the record holder, an appraisal 
petition directly with the Court of Chancery).  
26 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a).  
27 See generally Jiang, supra note 10, at 721 tbl.11 (“[T]here has been a surge of 
petitions, [since the mid-2000s], often led by a small group of hedge funds. The 
rise and dominance of these hedge fund players has prompted some commentators 
to consider the appraisal process not as providing a remedy but rather as an 
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expound the extant and prognosticated legislative and jurisprudential 
abatement of arbitrageurs’ licit utilization of the appraisal statute as an 
arbitrage apparatus.  
The first part of this Note discusses the transmutation of 
Delaware’s appraisal statute, from a minority shareholder remedy 
against the hegemony of the corporate majority, into a highly 
remunerative paragon of arbitrage. In 2007, the coalescence of the 
Court of Chancery’s Transkaryotic decision and the Delaware 
Legislature’s amendment to Delaware General Corporation Law 
rendered the appraisal remedy and, tangential to the statutory intent, 
appraisal arbitrage concomitants of section 262.28 Although the 
appraisal remedy has conceivably coexisted symbiotically29 with 
appraisal arbitrage—post-2007—within section 262, statistics indicate 
that arbitrageurs have increasingly accounted for a substantially larger 
number of appraisal petitions filed in the Court of Chancery, whereas 
pre-2008, individuals filed the majority of appraisal petitions.30  
These statistics substantiate the certitude that, consequent to the 
post-2007 state of the appraisal statute, appraisal arbitrageurs in 
Delaware had been given what bettors refer to as a pari-mutuel lock—
a guaranteed win in an information driven, pooled capital system. 
Equipped with this lock, appraisal arbitrageurs employed a betting and 
trading strategy, referred to as an anti-martingale system, which 
“involves halving a bet each time there is a trade loss, and doubling it 
each time there is a gain.”31 This trading method is often scrutinized 
for falling into the trap of the “hot hand fallacy,”32 but such a fallacy 
never affected appraisal arbitrageurs; rather, there was no fallacious 
component of the hot hand that such arbitrageurs possessed from 2007 
 
arbitrage in which professional investors (arbitrageurs) buy stock in a company on 
the brink of an acquisition and then petition the judge for a price increase . . . 
[which] has stoked concerns that a new form of strike suit has been born.”).  
28 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d) (2019).  
29 Jiang, supra note 10, at 700 (explaining that the statistics from the 2000-2014 
large-scale empirical study are supportive of the authors’ hypothesis that the 
contemporary § 262 serves its role as a shareholder appraisal remedy, while 
concurrently providing a successful strategy for arbitrageurs).  
30 Id. at 705 fig.2.  
31Anti-Martingale System, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/antimartingale.asp (last updated Apr. 5, 
2018) (defining the anti-martingale system of placing wagers or trades).  
32 Hot Hand, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hot-hand.asp 
(last updated June 24, 2018) (“Several common behavioral gaps, which can be 
brought on by a hot hand include overconfidence, confirmation bias, illusion of 
control, recency bias and hindsight bias.”). 
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through 2016.33 The fallacy only reared its head in 2016, when, 
contrary to 2007’s ignition of arbitrage, the Delaware Legislature and 
the Delaware Supreme Court somewhat clogged the appraisal 
arbitrage pipeline. 
The second part of this Note explores how Distributed Ledger 
Technology (“DLT”) could be implemented to expressly add the 
“share-tracing requirement”34 into section 262, which would have a 
profound effect on appraisal arbitrage through the standing 
requirements of sections 262(a) and (d).35 The standing requirements, 
as a by-product of the Court of Chancery’s interpretation of the 
statute’s record holder and dissenter requirements,36 cracked open the 
floodgates of appraisal litigation through which arbitrageurs have 
flowed.37 In a trilogy of Chancery Court decisions, referred to as the 
“Appraisal Arbitrage Cases,”38 the Court leniently construed the 
section 262 standing requirements in a light most favorable to 
appraisal arbitrageurs.39 In Transkaryotic the respondent-corporation 
contended that because Delaware precedent places “the burden of 
proof on the petitioner to demonstrate compliance with the 
requirements of the appraisal statute,”40 the petitioner was required, 
under section 262, to demonstrate that each individual share for which 
the petitioner sought appraisal had been voted against the merger, for 
purposes of standing.41 Despite respondent-corporation’s contentions, 
because of the “fungible bulk” issue and through a plain language 
reading of section 262, the Court of Chancery in Transkaryotic initially 
interpreted section 262 to mean that the record holder and dissenter 
requirements are to be strictly enforced.42 However, the Court held that 
because no such “share-tracing requirement” is expressly contained in 
sections 262(a) or (d), the Court would not usurp the role of the 
Delaware Legislature, via judicial aggrandizement, to imply such 
requirement into the statute.43  
 
33 See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
34 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 52–54 (Del. Ch. 2016).  
35 Id. at 51–52.  
36 Id.  
37 See Jiang, supra note 10.  
38 Dell, 143 A.3d at 36.  
39 In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. CIV.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 
1378345, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
40 Dell, 143 A.3d at 36.  
41 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345 at *2.  
42 Id. at *3.  
43 Id. at *5. 
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The Transkaryotic Court’s interpretation of the statute was 
affirmed approximately eight years later, in the tertiary decision of the 
Appraisal Arbitrage Cases, Merion Capital.44 The Merion Capital 
Court faced the same issue with different factual circumstances, due to 
the Delaware Legislature’s amendment to section 262 in response to 
the Transkaryotic decision, which allowed either a record holder or a 
beneficial owner of shares in a corporation to file an appraisal 
petition.45 However, the Merion Capital Court reached the same 
conclusion, noting the fungible bulk issue and finding that the focus of 
its inquiry for the record holder and dissenter requirements of section 
262 is on the actions of the petitioner-record holder, not the actual 
shares.46 
After the Appraisal Arbitrage Cases, the share-tracing requirement 
argument appeared to be a precedential loser for respondents at trial; 
however, a year after Merion Capital was decided, a mutual fund’s 
accidental vote in favor of a merger that it sought to contest and 
arbitrage proved that the share-tracing requirement did, in fact, exist to 
some degree.47 Citing a Delaware Supreme Court Case from 1963, the 
Chancery Court in Dell, for the first time, acknowledged the share-
tracing requirement of section 262, stating that “if there was evidence 
about how the record holder actually voted the specific shares, it did 
not matter that the shares themselves were held in fungible bulk.”48 
The Court also stressed the need for “recognition of the realities of 
modern stock practices and the necessity to afford such protection to 
stock beneficially owned as is not inconsistent with protection of the 
corporation’s rights.”49 Because modern stock practices need to be 
taken into account, a look to both domestic and global use of 
Blockchain technology in capital markets demonstrates how it could 
be used to police claims without merit from entering the realm of the 
appraisal remedy.   
In sum, this Note will first discuss the rise of appraisal arbitrage 
into prominence, and, subsequently, how it is currently threatened by 
Delaware courts’ contemporary favoritism of the efficient market 
hypothesis for purposes of valuation, which is likely not a 
jurisprudential anomaly. Second, this Note will discuss how, based on 
evidence of success in different markets, Blockchain Technology can 
 
44 Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., No. CV 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 67586, 
at *6–*7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015). 
45 See id. at *5; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e) (2019).  
46 See Merion Capital, 2015 WL 67586, at *6.  
47 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 52–54 (Del. Ch. 2016).  
48 Id at 41.  
49 Id.  
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be used as a share-tracing device to ensure that only meritorious 
appraisal actions are filed with the Court of Chancery. Taken together, 
it appears that appraisal arbitrage may begin to quickly falter.   
 
II. SECTION 262: A STATUTE AMENDED AND INTERPRETED TO VIVIFY 
A DORMANT “LOCK” IN A PARI-MUTUEL SYSTEM 
 
In a pari-mutuel horse-racing system, which is driven by variable 
odds that adjust in proportion to the volume of wagers placed on a 
particular outcome, a bettor traditionally has three general betting 
options: (1) win; (2) place; and (3) show.50 The first option, win, is 
axiomatic—the bettor bets on a certain horse to win the race. Of the 
three betting options, a win bet produces the best betting odds—the 
margin of payout—because there is only one statistically possible 
winning outcome; the wagered-on horse must win the race. The second 
option, place, will provide bettors with slightly less favorable, or safer, 
odds, because in order to win the bet, the wagered-on horse must finish 
either first or second, thus increasing the statistical likelihood of the 
bet winning. Similarly, the third option, a show bet, requires only that 
the horse finish in the top three; obviously, this bet will have the worst 
odds of the three bets because it has the highest statistical chance of 
winning.   
Additionally, a particular horse will carry with it its own odds that 
are factored into any of the three betting options, dependent upon its 
race record, physical attributes, and the jockey’s ability, among others. 
In other words, based on an inverse relationship between odds and 
likelihood of outcome (the higher the statistical likelihood of an 
outcome, the lower its odds will be), bettors must weigh the type of bet 
with a particular horse to target a combination thereof that is 
undervalued and ripe for betting. Because of innumerous 
uncontrollable variables, pari-mutuel bettors’ success is almost 
entirely dependent upon, in addition to some luck, the non-public, 
unique information that the bettors have, which other bettors do not.  
With regard to appraisal arbitrage, one must not lose sight of what 
is being “bet” on: shares of stock. Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of 
Berkshire Hathaway, likened stock picking to pari-mutuel betting on 
horse races in a speech in which he said that “a pari-mutuel system is 
 
50 Ed DeRosa, What Does Pari-Mautuel Betting Mean in Horse Racing?, 
TWINSPIRES, https://www.twinspires.com/betting-guides/what-is-pari-mutuel-
betting (last visited Apr. 21, 2019) (providing different pari-mutuel betting 
options).  
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a market. Everybody goes there and bets and the odds change based 
on what’s bet. That’s what happens in the stock market.”51 The main 
difference between a traditional pari-mutuel system and the theoretical 
pari-mutuel stock market system proposed by Munger is that, in horse 
racing, there is a finish line—the race ends; however, in Munger’s pari-
mutuel stock market system, no such definite end point exists. Thus, 
winners and losers are not necessarily the focus of the pari-mutuel 
stock market system; instead, the concept is premised on how 
information is invaluable in such a system and how that information is 
used to analyze investments that affect the odds of outcomes—the 
return on shares of stock invested in a corporation—as a measure of 
success.52 
The pari-mutuel concept in the context of appraisal arbitrage shares 
traits with both the traditional and the stock market conceptions of such 
systems. Similar to a traditional pari-mutuel system, the considerations 
that go into making a bet on a horse are analogous to the process that 
appraisal arbitrageurs undergo when selecting a deal to contest. Under 
the appraisal remedy pari-mutuel concept, where shares are pooled by 
stockholders—the other bettors—into a merger deal, arbitrageurs’ 
wagerable outcomes—historically, at least—were: (1) fair value in 
gross excess of deal price plus accrued interest; (2) fair value in 
moderate excess of fair value plus interest; or (3) fair value as deal 
price plus interest. More comparable to Munger’s theoretical stock 
market pari-mutuel system, which is helpful to conceptualize stock 
picking, arbitrageurs must select a deal to contest—short-term 
arbitrage of an undervalued firm versus long-term capital investment 
in undervalued shares of a firm—based on factors including the form 
of the merger,53 the deal price in comparison to the arbitrageurs’ own 
expert valuations of fair value, the cost of litigation, costs of litigation, 
as well as others discussed below. 
 
 
 
51 How Good Gamblers Think, FARNAM STREET, https://fs.blog/2013/01/how-good-
gamblers-think (last visited Apr. 21, 2019) (quoting the speech by Charlie Munger 
on his conceptualization of the stock market as a pari-mutuel system).   
52 Id.  
53 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2019) (“Appraisal rights shall be available 
for the shares of any class or series of stock of a constituent corporation in a merger 
or consolidation to be effected pursuant to § 251 (other than a merger effected 
pursuant to § 251(g) of this title), § 252, § 254, § 255, § 256, § 257, § 258, § 263 or 
§ 264 of this title.”).  
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A. The Appraisal Statute’s Pari-Mutuel Arbitrage System, 
Establisehed in 2007 
 
The appraisal statute was virtually quiescent until 2007; however, 
the cumulative effect of a landmark Chancery Court decision54 and 
Delaware Legislature’s amendment to section 26255 vivified an 
untrodden appositeness of appraisal arbitrage to the statute. The 
synthesized effect of the 2007 amendment to section 262 and the 
Transkaryotik decision resulted in a drastic influx of appraisal actions 
brought by arbitrageurs in Delaware.56 The volume of actions filed was 
accompanied by an essentially guaranteed gross return in excess of 
100% in such actions, attributable both to the Court’s reluctance to 
read a share-tracing requirement into section 262 in the Transkaryotic 
decision and to the 2007 amendment of section 262, awarding 
appraisal petitioners accrued interest on shares from the effective date 
of the merger until the date the judgment is paid, compounded 
quarterly.57 
In Transkaryotic, the Court of Chancery held that shares acquired 
after the record date of a merger are eligible for appraisal petition, 
irrespective of the fact that the predecessor beneficial owner of the 
shares might not have voted against the merger.58 The Transkaryotic 
Court did not focus inquiry not on whether, in accordance with the 
standing requirements of sections 262(a) and (d), the individual shares 
acquired by the petitioner-arbitrageur after the record date had been 
voted against the merger; rather, it held that, despite appraisal 
petitioners’ burden to prove compliance with the record holder and 
dissenter requirements of section 262,59 because of the convoluted 
 
54 Jiang, supra note 10, at 701, 705 fig.1 (explaining that, from 1977 to 1997, an 
annual average of 14 deals were challenged in the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
which decreased to approximately five deals challenged per year from 2000 to 
2002, which trended upward to approximately 14 deals challenged per year from 
2003-2006, spiked to 29 deals challenged in 2007, regressed to approximately 13 
annual deals challenged from 2008-2010, and from 2011-2014, the annual average 
increased drastically to approximately 21 deals challenged); see id. at 715 (“[s]ome 
legal scholars argue that the landscape of appraisals changed dramatically around 
2007–8, after the landmark Transkaryotic ruling and the 2007 amendment to the 
Delaware appraisal statute that set the default prejudgment interest rate.”).  
55 See Jiang, supra note 10, at 702.  
56 See Jiang, supra note 10, at 704–705. 
57 See Jiang, supra note 10, at 702; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019).  
58 In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. CIV.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 
1378345, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).  
59 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d). 
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nature by which shares in a target firm flow through the open market,60 
it would be impracticable to imply a share-tracing requirement into the 
statute. Further, the Court held that a plain reading of the statute 
revealed no such share-tracing requirement.  
Interestingly, at the end of its opinion, the Transkaryotic Court 
expressly addressed the petitioner’s “policy argument” that the Court’s 
decision will “pervert the goals of the appraisal statute by allowing it 
to be used as an investment tool for arbitrageurs as opposed to a 
statutory safety net for objecting stockholders.”61 To this contention, 
the Court responded powerfully that “[o]nly the record holder 
possesses and may perfect appraisal rights . . . [and] [t]he Legislature, 
not this Court, possesses the power to modify section 262 to avoid the 
evil, if it is an evil, that purportedly concerns respondents.”62 Such 
patent recognition of the existence of appraisal arbitrage by the 
Chancery Court was only a confirmation to arbitrageurs that this 
strategy was, until held otherwise, permissible under the statute.  
Consequent to the Transkaryotic decision, the Delaware 
Legislature amended section 262 to enable beneficial owners, as well 
as record holders, to file appraisal actions.63 Appended to this 
amendment, however, was a crucial component of appraisal 
arbitrage—a provision that awarded an accrued interest rate on shares 
for which petitioners sought appraisal.64 In essence, the 2007 
amendment was intended to allow minority dissenting shareholders to 
pursue appraisal litigation, which might otherwise have been cost 
inhibitive, by awarding, in proportion to the value of the shares for 
which appraisal is sought, interest on the shares at the Federal Reserve 
Discount Rate plus 5%.65 However, for appraisal arbitrageurs, this 
acted merely as an additional cushion on top of the arbitrageurs’ 
presumptive take-home of fair value at a gross return in excess of 
100%, on average.66 The Court of Chancery’s non-restrictive 
interpretation of section 262 and the statute’s subsequent amendment 
to award interest after the effective date of a merger quickly 
commanded the attention of arbitrageurs.  
With the 2007 developments of the appraisal statute in mind, the 
perspicuity of arbitrageurs’ lock on the pari-mutuel appraisal system 
becomes evident. Recall that a pari-mutuel bettor’s success is derived 
 
60 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *2–*3.  
61 Id. at *5.  
62 Id.  
63 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e).  
64 See id. § 262(h).  
65 Id.  
66 See Jiang, supra note 10. 
333192-OSU_BLJ.indd   18 8/28/19   8:50 AM
 
 
2019] THE DELAWARE APPRAISAL REMEDY   203
from the bettor’s exclusive information about particular outcomes. 
However, with respect to arbitrageurs, the construction of the appraisal 
statute, which allows arbitrageurs to assess and act upon public 
information about a particular merger, combined with arbitrageurs’ 
knowledge of the Chancery Court’s valuation methodologies and fair 
value decisions, is precisely what makes it such a profitable arbitrage 
strategy. That is, because there is a finish line in the appraisal pari-
mutuel system—the valuation judgment of the Court of Chancery—
and because arbitrageurs with substantial capital have access to deal 
particulars and the Chancery Court’s precedential valuation “market” 
information, arbitrageurs are practically capable of predict predicting 
outcomes—making legal what might be construed as insider trading in 
Munger’s pari-mutuel stock market system. Simply put, arbitrageurs 
seemingly could not lose.  
 
B. The Anti-Martingale Period of Appraisal Arbitrage 
 
Most contemporary forms of arbitrage involve some degree of risk; 
however, the post-2007 animation of the Delaware appraisal remedy 
functionally furnished arbitrageurs with what bettors refer to as a 
fallacious pari-mutuel “lock”—a guaranteed win. For these 
arbitrageurs, however, there was nothing fallacious about their lock on 
the pari-mutuel appraisal system. To comprehend the pari-mutuel lock 
concept, however, it is first necessary to examine traditional pari-
mutuel systems. A pari-mutuel system is a betting system where the 
funds from wagers, placed by bettors by purchasing a desired quantity 
of fixed price tickets at a horse racetrack, are collected into a pool from 
which the payout to the winner, or winners, is divided.67 In other 
words, in a traditional pari-mutuel betting system,68 bettors are betting 
against one another, while the track acts merely as a bailee of the 
private funds until winners are determined. One caveat is that the 
organization charged with maintaining the pari-mutuel market will 
take a certain percentage from the pool, irrespective of the outcome; 
however, for purposes of this Note, the commission that is taken from 
the pool reflects the costs of litigation.  
 
67 Pari-mutuel Gambling System, BRITTANICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/pari-mutuel (last visited Apr. 21, 2019). (“Most 
pari-mutuel systems are operated by [a] racetrack, although in France a national 
pari-mutuel system with offtrack branches was established in 1891. In pari-mutuel 
betting, the player buys a ticket on the horse he wishes to back. The payoff to 
winners is made from the pool of all bets on the various entries in a race.”). 
68 Id.   
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For example, the odds for a certain event will actively fluctuate to 
reflect betting trends, correlative to the number of tickets—the 
percentage of the pool—bet on each particular offered outcome, until 
the event begins and the pool is closed.69 If there is a three horse race 
and bettors, in the aggregate, purchase 100 tickets for Horse 1, 500 
tickets for Horse 2, and 400 tickets for Horse 3, then Horse 2 will have 
the best odds to win the race, but Horse 1 will have the largest payout 
if it wins. That is, if Horse 1 wins, then 90% of the pool is disbursed 
evenly amongst the 10% of bettors who chose Horse 1, in addition to 
the return of the bettors’ initial risk.  
With regard to the pari-mutuel stock market concept, Munger’s 
belief is that anyone can interpret the traits of a winning horse, just like 
anyone can discern the traits of successful stock; however, “the one 
thing that all those winning betters in the whole history of people 
who’ve beaten the pari-mutuel system have is quite simple. They bet 
very seldom.”70 The key, according to Munger, that accompanies a bet 
seldom approach is that “they bet big when they have the odds.”71 
Rather than follow Munger’s proposed bet seldom, but bet big, 
approach, arbitrageurs engaged in what is referred to by bettors and 
traders as an “anti-martingale system” of betting or trading.72 As 
appraisal litigation continued to result in judgments that awarded fair 
values in substantial excess of deal price, arbitrageurs doubled down 
on the arbitrage strategy, and the volume of appraisal cases steadily 
increased, correlative to consistent and markedly profitable 
outcomes.73 
Similar to the collected information that a horse-racing bettor will 
weigh when choosing a horse to wager on—size, jockey, record, 
performance in like-conditions, etcetera—arbitrageurs must also 
consider their possessed information in relation to the deal structure, 
deal price, record date, court precedent on valuation, and prerequisites 
for standing. However, post-2007, arbitrageurs had a significant 
tactical informational advantage: arbitrageurs were armed with the 
knowledge that, among other considerations, (1) the Court of Chancery 
did not require proof that individual shares were voted against the 
merger; (2) valuation methods used by the Court of Chancery 
essentially guaranteed a gross return in excess of 100%; (3) from the 
 
69 Id.   
70 See FARNAM STREET, supra note 51.  
71 FARNAM STREET, supra note 51.  
72 See Jiang, supra note 10. 
73 Id.  
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effective date of the contested merger, arbitrageurs are awarded 
accrued interest at the Federal Reserve Discount Rate plus 5%; and (4) 
because deal price has already been established, which provides 
arbitrageurs the distinct advantage of conducting their own valuation 
of a target company to determine both if deal price is significantly 
undervalued enough to contest the merger and, derivatively, whether 
the gross return would be worth the costs.74 Thus, one could hardly say 
that arbitrageurs were wagering if they already knew what the outcome 
would be. 
To demonstrate this advantage, hypothetically, for a merger in a 
pari-mutuel system without appraisal rights, when Corporation A (the 
purchasing firm) and Corporation B (the target firm) enter into a 
merger agreement and announce the merger (the record date), the pari-
mutuel pool is effectively closed to bettors—purchasing shares after 
the record date of the merger would merely produce a return equal to 
the initial capital stake of such investor. However, appraisal arbitrage 
in the pari-mutuel system context allows arbitrageurs, proceeding with 
exceptionally accurate outcome predictive information, to wager on 
per-share fair value, appraised by the Court of Chancery, after the 
record date, which, in a traditional pari-mutuel system, would be post-
closing of the pari-mutuel wager pool. In other words, in appraisal 
litigation over the fair value of shares in a merger, section 262 acts as 
a permutation in an otherwise unaffectable pari-mutuel pool, which 
effectively guarantees arbitrageurs a sizeable, near-simultaneous gain, 
above deal price of the merger. Post-2007, arbitrageurs tested this 
strategy and, until 2017, it was immensely profitable. 
 
C. Has the Delaware Supreme Court’s Decisions in Dfc and Dell 
Foiled Arbitrageurs’ Lock on the Pari-Mutuel Appraisal System?  
 
Under section 262, when the Court of Chancery determines fair 
value in appraisal cases, the Court must consider all relevant indicia of 
fair value, exclusive of any synergies that resulted from either the 
announcement of merger or the closing of a merger.75 Precedentially, 
upon the Court of Chancery’s determination that a stockholder 
complied with the conditions of section 262 to become entitled to 
appraisal rights, litigation would take place before the Court, in which 
 
74 Id.  
75 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019) (providing the guidelines the 
Chancery must follow when it determines fair value).  
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the Court would, through valuation methods76 presented by experts on 
behalf of petitioner and respondent, as well as the Court’s own 
proffered valuation method, determine fair value of the shares of such 
stockholder-petitioner, which was almost invariably held to be in 
excess of deal price.77  
The trend in choice of valuation methodology changed drastically 
in 2017, however, when the Delaware Supreme Court heard the DFC 
Global appeal from the Court of Chancery.78 The Delaware Supreme 
Court opined that, while the appraisal statute permits no presumption 
in favor of deal price for fair value, because the Court of Chancery 
found the deal process in the case to be “robust,” such determination 
gives substantial weight to deal price as fair value; however, the Court 
of Chancery did not accord any such weight.79 The DFC Global case 
was the first indicator of the Delaware Supreme Court’s renewed faith 
in the markets as indicators of fair value, which also served somewhat 
as a warning to the Court of Chancery with regard to its valuation 
practices.80 However, the Court of Chancery did not make any 
adjustments.   
Months after the DFC Global case was decided, the appraisal of 
Dell was reversed on appeal from the Court of Chancery to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, which seemed to indicate that the Delaware 
Supreme Court accorded more reliance upon deal price as fair value 
than it professed in DFC Global.81 When the Delaware Supreme Court 
heard Dell, it again reviewed the Court of Chancery’s valuation 
methodology and, in somewhat of a scolding manner, stated that “the 
Court of Chancery’s analysis ignored the efficient market hypothesis 
long endorsed by this Court.”82 The efficient market hypothesis 
“teaches that the price produced by an efficient market is generally a 
 
76 Ronald N. Brown, III & Keenan D. Lynch, Skadden Discusses Delaware Courts’ 
M&A Appraisal Valuation Methods, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 19, 2016), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/12/19/skadden-discusses-appraisal-
valuation-methods-employed-in-merger-transactions-by-delaware-courts 
(discussing the traditional valuation methodologies employed by the Court of 
Chancery in key decisions, which tended to be discounted cash flow analyses, 
comparable companies analyses, presented by experts of both petitioner and 
respondent, for the Chancellors’ determination as to fair value).   
77 Id.  
78 DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017). 
79 Id. at 388.  
80 Id.  
81 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 
2017). 
82 Id. at 24. 
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more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst, 
especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation 
imperatives of a well-heeled client.”83  
The Delaware Supreme Court indicated that the Court of 
Chancery’s utilization of a Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”) analysis 
was clearly erroneous because it “was the antithesis of any economist’s 
definition of fair market value” because the Court of Chancery “picked 
a price higher than any strategic [buyer] would pay because, in 
economic terms, no strategic [buyer] believed it could exploit a 
purported $6.8 billion value gap.”84 The Court then offered guidance 
on when DCF valuations were appropriate, providing that DCF 
valuations are “considered the best tool for valuing companies when 
there is no credible market information and no market check,” but 
warned that because “DCF valuations involve many inputs—all 
subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed 
experts—and even slight differences in these inputs can produce large 
valuation gaps.”85 Moreover, from a policy standpoint, the Delaware 
Supreme Court lamented that, “[i]f the reward for adopting many 
mechanisms designed to minimize conflict and ensure stockholders 
obtain the highest possible value is to risk the court adding a premium 
to the deal price based on a DCF analysis, then the incentives to adopt 
best practices will be greatly reduced.”86 
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded, however, that it would 
remand the case to the Court of Chancery, but that it would not 
mandate use of deal price for fair value; rather, it left open the 
possibility for the Vice Chancellor to implement some variation of a 
DCF or other model, so long as it was in accordance with the 
guidelines in the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion.87 On remand to 
the Court of Chancery, the presiding Vice Chancellor, Travis Laster, 
ordered approval of the settlement agreement between the petitioner 
and Dell, and the case was dismissed with prejudice.88 
Subsequent to the Delaware Supreme Court’s scornful opinion in 
Dell, the valuation methodology of the Court of Chancery has changed 
drastically. In the first appraisal trial before the Court of Chancery 
since the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Dell, the Court of 
 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 37. 
85 Id. at 38.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 44.  
88 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2018 WL 2939448, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
June 11, 2018).  
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Chancery complied with the Delaware Supreme Court’s favoritism 
toward the efficient market hypothesis. In Aruba, the Court of 
Chancery issued a shocking decision in which it found that “the best 
evidence of Aruba’s fair value as a going concern, exclusive of any 
value derived from the merger, is its thirty-day average unaffected 
market price of $17.13 per share . . . [which] is lower than Aruba’s 
proposed figure of $19.75 per share.”89  
After the radical decision in Aruba, the Court of Chancery decided 
AOL, in which it established factors for when deal price is the proper 
measure for fair value—that is, the deal is “Dell Compliant.”90 
However, the Court of Chancery did not find the AOL deal to be Dell-
Compliant; thus, the Court of Chancery employed its own DCF, again 
finding that fair value was below deal price.91 However, perhaps 
providing some hope to appraisal arbitrage, there was one post-DFC 
and Dell case that resulted in a fair value in excess of deal price—albeit 
only marginally.92  
Considered together, the results of the recent cases before the Court 
of Chancery does not bode well for appraisal arbitrageurs. These Court 
of Chancery appraisal cases, along with the antecedent Delaware 
Supreme Court decisions of DFC Global and Dell, provide guidance 
as to what factors will be taken into account for the Chancery Court’s 
future valuation methodologies.93 One conclusion that seems evident 
from these cases, however, is that appraisal arbitrageurs have lost their 
lock on the appraisal pari-mutuel system.  
 
 
 
 
89 Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. CV 11448-
VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *55 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018). 
90 In re AOL Inc., No. CV 11204-VCG, 2018 WL 1037450, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
23, 2018) (“(i) information was sufficiently disseminated to potential bidders, so 
that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii) without undue impediments 
imposed by the deal structure itself. In other words, before I may consider the deal 
price as persuasive evidence of statutory fair value, I must find that the deal process 
developed fair market value. I conclude that, under the unique circumstances of this 
case, the sales process was insufficient to this task, and the deal price is not the best 
evidence of fair value.”).  
91 Id. at *21.  
92 Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Companies, Inc., No. CV 
11184-VCS, 2018 WL 3602940, at *39 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018) (finding deal price 
not to be a good indicator of fair value, the Court relied on a DCF analysis and 
appraised the per-share fair value to be $0.66 above deal price).  
93 See supra notes 75–92 and accompanying text.  
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III. BLOCKCHAIN’S DISTRIBUTED LEDGER CAPABILITIES AND THE 
SHARE-TRACING REQUIREMENT 
 
In pari-mutuel betting systems, programmers have designed 
security software that polices the electronically maintained betting 
pools that exist today. One function of the software is to detect 
inefficiencies that would allow for arbitrage opportunities. However, 
appraisal arbitrage is an anomalous opportunity within a pari-mutuel 
system, where a share-tracing function is impracticable and thus 
unenforceable. This is an anomaly in modern pari-mutuel systems. 
That is, the combination of the Court of Chancery’s jurisprudence and 
the amendments to section 262 created a virtually “no-risk” form of 
arbitrage. Arbitrageurs, as spectators of this pari-mutuel appraisal 
system, detected a capitalizable market inefficiency, which was 
statutorily and jurisprudentially created: the ability to purchase shares 
of stock in a target firm of a merger, without a required showing that 
the shares were voted against the merger, and perfect appraisal rights 
on those shares, which the Court of Chancery invariably appraised at 
per-share fair value in excess of deal price—increased by interest at 
the Federal Reserve Discount Rate plus 5%.  
Contrary to the Chancery Court’s repeated dismissals of the 
existence of the share-tracing requirement, in Dell, the Court 
distinguished the Appraisal Arbitrage Decisions, also referred to as the 
“Absence of Proof” cases, on grounds that, despite the inherent 
impracticability imposed by a share-tracing requirement, if the vote of 
particular shares can be traced, then such evidence must be admissible 
by the respondent.94 The Dell Court’s logic is that, once a petitioner 
satisfies its burden of showing that its record holder held a sufficient 
number of shares voted against the merger to account for the shares for 
which petitioner seeks, then the burden shifts to respondent to adduce 
evidence to the contrary.95 If such proof can substantiate the 
petitioner’s failure to vote its shares against the merger, then the record 
holder requirement is not satisfied, and such shares do not qualify for 
appraisal.96  
While the Dell Court verified the existence of the share-tracing 
requirement in some form, it was only acknowledged because of an 
affirmative record-based error, in which the petitioner’s shares for 
which appraisal was sought were accidentally voted in favor of, instead 
 
94 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 37 (Del. Ch. 2016).   
95 Id.   
96 Id. 
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of against, the merger.97 The issue that remains is the ability, absent 
human voting error in favor of a merger, to have an effective vote-
tracing system, largely because of the nature in which shares are held 
by record holders, on behalf of beneficial owners, in a fungible bulk. 
However, based on the Delaware Blockchain Initiative and the 
implementation of Blockchain Technology as a ledger system in 
security exchanges throughout the world, if “recognition of modern 
stock practices” is truly taken into account, it becomes possible—if not 
probable—that Blockchain can become the enforcer of the share-
tracing requirement that section 262 is missing. If so, then appraisal 
arbitrage stands to be drastically reduced.  
 
A. The Share-Tracing Requirement—Nonrecognition to  
Acknowledgment from an Accidental Record of Proof 
 
In order to properly exercise the appraisal right, which is attached 
to each, individual share, the record shareholder98—historically99—
needed to vote against the merger; that is, when the shareholder vote 
is held, each share has a right to vote and, if either no vote is cast on 
behalf of the share, or the share votes against the deal, then that 
particular share loses its right to appraisal.100  
Herein lies a massive advantage that exists for appraisal 
arbitrageurs. Many of the targets involved in these deals are multi-
billion-dollar corporations101 that correspondingly have millions of 
outstanding shares.102 Long gone are the days when the beneficial 
 
97 Id.  
98 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(a)(1) (2019) (“Stockholder” means a holder of 
record of stock in a stock corporation.). 
99 Id. (§ 220(a)(1) was amended to expand “stockholders,” beyond holders of 
record, to include “a person who is the beneficial owner of shares of such stock.”). 
100 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2019) (“Any stockholder of a corporation of 
this State who holds shares of stock . . . and who has neither voted in favor of the 
merger or consolidation nor consented thereto . . . shall be entitled to an appraisal 
by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of the stockholder’s shares of stock.”). 
101 Christopher Wink, 64% of Fortune 500 Firms Are Delaware Incorporations: 
Here’s Why, TECHNICAL.LY (September 23, 2014, 10:11 AM), 
https://technical.ly/delaware/2014/09/23/why-delaware-incorporation (“More than 
half of U.S. publicly-traded companies and fully 64 percent of the Fortune 500 
were among that number.”).  
102 Outstanding Shares, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/outstandingshares.asp (last updated Dec. 11, 
2017) (Outstanding shares refer to a company’s stock currently held by all its 
shareholders, including share blocks held by institutional investors and restricted 
shares owned by the company’s officers and insiders.).  
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owner of shares actually invested them in companies personally; 
today, these shares are held by a record shareholder,103 nominated by 
the Depository Trust Company (“DTC”),104 from whom the record 
shareholder acquires a “fungible bulk” of shares.105 Because these 
shares are “after-acquired”106 by the arbitrageurs, there is a chance that 
the shares have already been voted by a beneficial owner prior to the 
acquisition of the share by the record holder. However, it would be 
nearly impossible for the record holder of millions of shares to trace 
the vote of each individual share, especially the after-acquired shares 
of the target by the arbitrageurs.107  
This was addressed by the Court of Chancery, and it interpreted 
section 262 to hold that the beneficial owner of the shares seeking 
appraisal need not demonstrate the vote status of each individual share 
held of record by a depository; rather, the Chancery Court found that 
shareholder of record need only demonstrate the record shareholder—
the depository—had not taken a voting action inconsistent with 
appraisal requirements.108 In essence, because of the difficult of tracing 
the vote status of each individual share, the Chancery Court was 
 
103 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a)(1) (2019) (“[A] holder of record of stock in 
a stock corporation, or a person who is the beneficial owner of shares of such stock 
held either in a voting trust or by a nominee on behalf of such person.”). 
104 The Depository Trust Company (DTC), DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORP., 
http://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidiaries/dtc (“The Depository Trust 
Company (DTC), established in 1973, was created to reduce costs and provide 
clearing and settlement efficiencies by immobilizing securities and making "book-
entry" changes to ownership of the securities.”).  
105  In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. CIV.A. 1554-CC, 2007 
WL 1378345, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (“The securities deposited as a part of 
this system are held in an undifferentiated manner known as ‘fungible bulk,’ which 
means that no DTC participant, no customer of any participant (such as an 
intermediary bank or broker), and no investor who might ultimately have a 
beneficial interest in securities registered to Cede, has any ownership rights to any 
particular share of stock reflected on a certificate held by Cede.”).  
106 Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., No. CV 6247-VCP, 2013 WL 
3793896, at *24 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013), judgment entered sub nom. Merion 
Capital, L.P v. 3M Cogent, Inc. (Del. Ch. 2013) (After-acquired shares are shares 
that are acquired “after the Merger was announced.”).  
107 In re Ancestry.Com, Inc., No. CV 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 66825, at *8 n. 49 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (“I use the term ‘share-tracing requirement’ as a shorthand 
for the burden that Ancestry suggests the statute imposes on appraisal petitioners; it 
is somewhat imprecise, as Ancestry suggests that the burden could be met in a 
number of ways, including through, for instance, a petitioner buying shares after 
the record date also buying sufficient proxies to cover the number of shares for 
which it seeks appraisal.”).  
108 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3.  
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merely concerned with the vote action taken by the depository. Thus, 
until Dell, so long as the record holder held enough shares of record 
voted against the deal, then the appraisal remedy could be perfected.109  
 
1. Nonrecognition of the Share-Tracing Requirement: The 
“Appraisal Arbitrage Decisions”   
 
In Transkaryotic, a merger was announced between Transkaryotic 
(“TKT”) Therapies, Inc., which was designed to merge TKT with and 
into its wholly owned subsidiary, Shire Pharmaceuticals Group plc.110 
At the time of the record date,111 Cede & Co., the DTC nominee, was 
the record holder of a fungible bulk of 29,720,074 shares of TKT.112 
Of the aggregate shares held of record by Cede & Co., 12,882,000 
shares were voted in favor of the merger, and 9,888,663 share were 
voted against the merger, while the remaining 6,949,411 shares 
abstained from the vote.113 Petitioners held 2,901,433 shares at the 
record date of the merger.114 After the record date, but before the 
effective date of the merger, petitioners purchased an additional 
8,017,217 shares and sought appraisal on all 10,972,650 shares that 
petitioners owned in aggregate.115 
The issue that arose in the case was “whether under 8 Del. C. § 262 
a beneficial owner, who acquires shares after the record date, must 
prove that each of its specific shares for which it seeks appraisal was 
not voted in favor of the merger?”116 The Court of Chancery held that 
because “a purchasing beneficial owner takes subject to the actions and 
inactions of the previous beneficial owner,” then, “[i]f the previous 
beneficial owner voted stock in favor of the merger, the current 
beneficial owner may not seek appraisal for those shares.”117 The 
Court went on to explain that, “[i]f the previous beneficial owner voted 
against the merger, the current owner may seek appraisal for those 
shares,” but, “[i]f no record exists as to how the previous beneficial 
 
109 Id.   
110 Id. at *1. 
111 Id. (providing that the record date for the merger was June 10, 2005).  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Id.  
117 Id.  
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owner voted, then this Court must not allow appraisal since the 
petitioner would not have complied with its burden under § 262.”118  
Succinctly, the Court stated that the question to be answered in the 
case was, “[m]ust a beneficial shareholder, who purchased shares after 
the record date but before the merger vote, prove, by documentation, 
that each newly acquired share (i.e., after the record date) is a share not 
voted in favor of the merger by the previous beneficial 
shareholder?”119 Due to the fact that the Delaware General Corporation 
Law was literally read to only be concerned with the record 
shareholder for the purpose of perfecting appraisal rights, the Court 
held that only “the record holder’s actions determine perfection of the 
right to seek appraisal.”120 That is, the previous beneficial owner, who 
may or may not have voted in favor of the merger (eviscerating the 
right to seek appraisal), is irrelevant for the purpose of a subsequent 
beneficial shareholder instructing its designated record holder (Cede 
& Co., in this case) to perfect petitioner appraisal rights.121  
The Transkaryotic Court opined that the only action that mattered 
was the action of the record shareholder, Cede & Co., which perfected 
appraisal rights, on behalf of the petitioners—beneficial owners of 
shares—in compliance with section 262.122 The Court reached this 
conclusion based upon a mere literal reading of the statute as written, 
and the Court placed the onus on the Delaware Legislature to amend 
the statute to avoid the alleged “[perversion of] the goals of the 
appraisal statute by allowing it to be used as an investment tool for 
arbitrageurs as opposed to a statutory safety net for objecting 
stockholders.”123 Despite this burden-shifting tactic of the Court of 
Chancery, many legal commentators contend that “appraisal arbitrage 
has been facilitated by the Delaware Chancery Court decision of In re 
Appraisal Transkaryotic Therapies Inc.”124 These commentators 
believe that the Court of Chancery was the catalyst for appraisal 
arbitrageurs because the Court “held that shareholders who purchased 
their stock in the target company after the stockholders’ meeting, but 
 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at *3.  
120 Id.  
121 Id. at *4. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at *4–*5.  
124 Rich Bodnar, Does an Appraisal Action Preclude a Fiduciary Breach Claim?, 
LOWENSTEIN SANDLER (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://www.appraisalrightslitigation.com/category/no-proof-of-wrongdoing-
needed. 
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before the stockholder vote, could seek appraisal despite not having 
the right to vote those shares at the meeting.”125 
In Merion Capital,126 the Chancery Court once again addressed the 
share tracing requirement—or lack thereof—and clarified and 
extended its Transkaryotic decision.127 The Delaware Supreme Court 
held that when the petitioner is a record shareholder that has acquired 
its shares after the record date from the “fungible bulk” at the 
depository, the petitioner need not show that each individual 
previously owned share had not been voted in favor of the deal by its 
previous owner.128 Instead, for the shares for which the petitioner 
sought appraisal, the petitioner needed to show that it had not voted 
the shares in favor of the deal and that the previous record holder held 
enough shares that were not voted in favor of the deal to cover the 
amount of shares for which the petitioner sought appraisal.129  
Although complex, this process becomes simple once illustrated. 
For example, Company X (purchaser) and Company Y (target) enter 
into an agreement on January 1, 2018, whereby Company Y is to sell 
its shares to Company X at a deal price of $100 per share. The deal is 
set to close on January 1, 2019, the effective date. For the sake of 
simplicity, assume that Company Y has 10 million total shares, all of 
which are outstanding.130 Of the 10 million outstanding shares, 5 
million are held in a fungible bulk by Record Holder A for Company 
Y beneficial owners.  
The record date is January 20, 2018, and the shareholder vote to 
approve the merger is set for February 1, 2018. Company Y timely 
notifies its shareholders 20 days131 prior to the meeting of their 
appraisal rights. At this point in time, the beneficial owners of the 
shares held by Record Holder A begin to direct Record Holder A on 
 
125 Id.  
126 Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., No. CV 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 
67586, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (“Because I find that the unambiguous 
language of the statute does not give rise to any such share-tracing requirement, 
and that Merion has otherwise complied with the requirements of Section 262, I 
hold that Merion has perfected its right to appraisal.”).  
127 See supra text accompanying note 27.  
128 Merion Capital, 2015 WL 67586, at *3 n.20 (“[F]inding that Transkaryotic 
remains in force to permit a record holder to perfect appraisal rights for beneficial 
owners as long as the record holder holds sufficient shares in fungible bulk not 
voted in favor of the merger to cover the number of shares for which the beneficial 
owner seeks to have appraised.”).  
129 Id.  
130 Outstanding Shares, supra note 102. 
131 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2019).  
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how to vote their respective shares: (1) in favor of the merger; (2) no 
action taken in the vote; or (3) against the merger.132 Record Holder A 
does not connect each individual share to its beneficial shareholder 
with respect to the vote, hence the “fungible bulk” concept. Rather, 
Record Holder A is aware that it has 5 million total shares and 
correspondingly cannot exceed 5 million total votes, irrespective of the 
voting position of each specific share.  
On February 12, 2018, Hedge Fund approaches Record Holder A 
and buys 1 million of the 5 million shares Depository held of record of 
Company Y. Before the February 1, 2018, shareholder vote, Hedge 
Fund directs Record Holder A to vote all 1 million of its shares against 
the merger, with adequate formal notice provided to Company Y that 
Hedge Fund will seek appraisal. The dust settles and Record Holder A 
votes 3 million shares in favor of the merger and 2 million against the 
merger, with a formal appraisal request sent on account of the 2 million 
shares that dissented.133 The other 5 million outstanding shares, held 
by Record Holder B, are all voted in favor of the merger. The votes are 
tallied and the merger is approved—8 million in favor and 2 million 
against the merger.  
Because Hedge Fund bought its shares after the record date, there 
is a significant likelihood that some of the shares it purchased from the 
fungible bulk were, in fact, voted against the merger. However, based 
on Delaware courts’ precedent, all that is pertinent to the appraisal 
remedy is that Hedge Fund holds 1 million of the 2 million shares that 
comprise the “fungible bulk” that Record Holder A voted against the 
merger, and that Hedge Fund seeks to perfect its appraisal rights on 
those particular shares. This, however, somewhat changed in Dell, 
decided one year after Merion Capital.  
 
2. The Dell Court’s Clarification of the Appraisal Arbitrage 
Cases Offers Proof of the Share Tracing Requirement’s 
Existence in Section 262   
 
The Dell Court distinguished the case before it, on grounds that 
“the Appraisal Arbitrage Decisions address[ed] a situation in which 
there [was] an absence of proof.”134 This “absence of proof” distinction 
is because, in the Appraisal Arbitrage Decisions, “no evidence was 
available to show how [the record holder] voted the particular shares 
 
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
134 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 37 (Del. Ch. 2016).  
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for which appraisal was sought, and the record suggested that no one 
who held shares in street name135 would be able to satisfy Section 
262(a) if it required establishing how [the record holder] voted specific 
shares.”136 However, “[i]t does not necessarily follow that just because 
in some cases there is no evidence regarding how [the record holder] 
voted, then in other cases where it does exist the parties cannot 
introduce it and the court cannot consider it.”137 
Furthermore, “if the Record Holder Requirement prevents the 
parties and the court from looking beyond [the record holder’s] 
aggregate voting totals, then neither can know ‘the dissentients and the 
extent of the dissent.’” If the Record Holder Requirement is interpreted 
in that manner, then “[i]n lieu of ‘order and certainty, and a sure source 
of information,’ the voting process is hidden behind a depository veil 
of ignorance.”138 Instead, the Dell Court presented a new proof-
substantiated view of the share-tracing requirement, providing that 
“the solution” to the record holder requirement is to accord 
“recognition of the realities of modern stock practices”139 and merely 
because a record holder “outsourced [certain] parts of the voting 
process does not mean an iron curtain has descended to isolate the 
resulting evidence from the legal system.”140 Instead, “[i]t simply 
means that the litigants must obtain the information . . . and they 
readily can.”  
Applying these principles, if a petitioner satisfies its burden of 
proving “that the Dissenter Requirement was met by showing that 
there were sufficient shares at [the record holder] that were not voted 
in favor of the merger to cover the appraisal class” then, absent 
evidence to the contrary, such a “showing is dispositive.”141 However, 
“[o]nce the appraisal petitioner has made out a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the corporation to show that [the record holder] 
 
135 In Street Name, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/instreetname.asp (last updated Feb. 27, 
2018) (“In street name is slang for when a brokerage account holds a 
customer’s securities and assets under the name of the brokerage firm, rather than 
the name of the individual who is the legal owner of a security. Although the name 
on a stock certificate is not that of the individual, they are still listed as the real 
and beneficial owner and have the rights associated with the security.”).  
136 Dell, 143 A.3d at 37. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 41. 
140 Id. at 53. 
141 Id.  
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actually voted the shares for which the petitioner seeks appraisal in 
favor of the merger.”142  
 
B. Blockchain Technology: The Proof That the Share-Tracing 
Requirement Has Been Missing 
 
This section of the Note is not a pretentious examination of the 
theoretical intricacies of Blockchain; rather, it is a realistic discussion 
of the potential that Blockchain has to ensure that only meritorious 
appraisal arbitrage actions—in which shares for which appraisal is 
sought are proven to have been voted against the merger—are brought 
by petitioners. However, to understand the revolutionary role that 
Blockchain can serve in the realm of appraisal litigation, it is essential 
to understand some fundamental principles about the enigmatic 
technology. As a preliminary matter, Blockchain—as it would apply 
to appraisal litigation—is not to be conflated with its application to 
Cryptocurrency.143 That is, Cryptocurrency merely utilizes Blockchain 
as the technological vessel that facilitates its Crypto-market 
databases.144 However, Blockchain itself is merely a derivation of 
Distributed Ledger Technology (“DLT”), which is the overarching 
cyber registry technology that makes Blockchain, and its sibling 
applications, operational. 145 
 
1. DLT and the Delaware “Blockchain Initiative” Amendments 
 
DLT, in its simplest form, is a peer-to-peer146 network of 
“nodes”147 that operate simultaneously to create a database without any 
centralized administration. 148 Amongst the primary advantages of 
DLT are its speed, virtually instantaneous updates to data, 
decentralized protection from manipulation, and immutable 
 
142 Id.  
143 Blockchain, Explained, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp (last updated Feb. 10, 2019) 
(“[B]lockchain is a distributed, decentralized, public ledger.”).  
144 Id.  
145 Blockchain & Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 
12, 2018) https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/blockchain-dlt.  
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Id.   
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accuracy.149 Blockchain uses DLT technology to permanently record 
a discrete transaction into an individual data “block” that exists in a 
chronological “chain,” and, as more blocks—transactions—are linked 
to the chain, the initial block imprints subsequent blocks with a 
distinctive code, which creates an indelible lineage of transactions 
traceable back to inception.150  
For example, Company X has 5 million authorized shares, all of 
which have been stored and traced by Blockchain technology from 
each share’s respective date of issuance by Company X. Company X 
then issues an additional 1 million share, 100 of which are purchased 
by Investor A. Immediately upon issuance, there are 1 million new 
blocks that were created, each of which unique and discernable from 
the rest. Subsequently, upon purchase by Investor A, each of the 100 
individual shares generates a new block, which reflects the purchase 
by Investor A. The 100 shares, each individually, are now traceable 
back to Company X’s issuance—the original block—through Investor 
A—the subsequent block.  
Company Y then approaches Company X and the two firms enter 
into a merger agreement. The record date of the merger passes and 
Investor A is informed by proxy about the shareholder vote on the 
merger. Investor A, pleased with the merger, votes all 100 shares in 
favor of the merger, thereby creating a new block in the chronological 
chain that represents the affirmative vote on the merger. This 
immutable time stamp, so to speak, is permanent record that each of 
these 100 shares voted to approve the merger. Therefore, if Hedge 
Fund approaches Investor A to purchase Investor A’s 100 shares, there 
will be an everlasting link that connects Hedge Fund’s purchase of 
Investor A’s 100 shares, to the blocks that indicate the vote in favor of 
the proposed merger, all the way back to Investor A’s initial purchase 
from the original issuance of the 1 million shares by Company X. In 
other words, the pristine record tracks each and every action taken with 
respect to all individual shares, which renders impossible the 
perfection of appraisal rights on shares that, going back to the 
Transkaryotic decision, would have been deemed untraceable and, 
therefore, eligible to initiate an appraisal petition.  
Such an application of Blockchain is not speculation; rather, there 
are many indicators that Blockchain can be the section 262 share-
 
149 Distributed Ledger Technology, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/distributed-ledger-technology-dlt.asp (last 
updated Jan. 25, 2018).  
150 Blockchain, Explained, supra note 143. 
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tracing enforcer that the Delaware courts have lacked throughout years 
of appraisal arbitrage litigation.151 Preliminary evidence is that the 
Delaware Legislature has demonstrated that it is not loath to the 
codified implementation of Blockchain in the Delaware General 
Corporation Law.152 Effective August 1, 2017, the Delaware General 
Corporation Law was amended153 in part to authorize Delaware 
corporations’ “use [of] networks of electronic databases (examples of 
which are described currently as ‘distributed ledgers’ or a 
‘blockchain’) for the creation and maintenance of corporate records, 
including the corporation’s stock ledger.”154 The pertinent sections 
amended to encompass DLT in Senate Bill No. 69 were section 219,155 
section 224,156 and section 232.157 However, the amendments reach 
into other sections that are more directly related to the share tracing 
requirements of section 262.158 
Currently, section 219(c) defines a “stock ledger” as “1 or more 
records administered by or on behalf of the corporation” that includes 
“the names of all of the corporation’s stockholders of record, the 
address and number of shares registered in the name of each such 
stockholder, and all issuances and transfers of stock of the corporation 
are recorded in accordance with § 224.”159 Stock ledger, as defined in 
section 219(c), is expanded upon in section 224 to explain that a 
Delaware corporation is authorized to keep any of its records “on, or 
by means of, or be in the form of, any information storage device, 
method, or 1 or more electronic networks or databases (including 1 or 
more distributed electronic networks or databases).”160  
A pertinent connection between the Blockchain language of 
section 224 and the share tracing requirement of section 262 is the 
allowance of DLT record keeping “to prepare the list of stockholders 
 
151 See discussion supra Section II.C.  
152 See Marco A. Santori, Governor Jack Markell Announces Delaware Blockchain 
Initiative, GLOBAL DELAWARE BLOG (June 10, 2016), 
http://global.blogs.delaware.gov/2016/06/10/delaware-to-create-distributed-ledger-
based-share-ownershipstructure-as-part-of-blockchain-initiative 
[http://perma.cc/BRG9-4YFU].   
153 S.B. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Synopsis (Del. 2017).  
154 Id.  
155 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219 (2019). 
156 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224 (2019). 
157 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 232 (2019).  
158 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 218, 219 (2019). 
159 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219.  
160 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224. 
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specified in §§ 219 and 220.”161 This is important because one of the 
essential functions of section 219 is to explain Delaware corporations’ 
requirements for mandatory and complete lists of shareholders that are 
able to vote at corporations’ shareholder meetings. 162 Particularly, 
section 219(a) provides that “[t]he corporation shall prepare, at least 
10 days before every meeting of stockholders, a complete list of the 
stockholders entitled to vote at the meeting,” but “if the record date for 
determining the stockholders entitled to vote is less than 10 days before 
the meeting date, the list shall reflect the stockholders entitled to vote 
as of the tenth day before the meeting date.”163 Further, section 
220(a)(1) defines a stockholder as “a holder of record of stock in a 
stock corporation, or a person who is the beneficial owner of shares of 
such stock held either in a voting trust or by a nominee on behalf of 
such person.”164  
The interrelation of the amendments to these sections of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law is encouraging for the 
implementation of DLT into section 262 share tracing requirements for 
mergers. Pursuant to the enactment of these amendments, corporations 
are enabled to maintain mandatory lists of shareholders authorized to 
vote (e.g., shareholders that are entitled to vote for or against a merger) 
with the assistance and accuracy of DLT.165 While the amendments 
made to these sections of the Delaware General Corporation Law do 
not specifically address the share tracing requirement, the functions of 
the amendments do signal that section 262 might soon be amended to 
include DLT implementation.  
 
2. Blockchain Implementation Into Domestic and International 
Financial Markets Has Proven Viable  
 
The United States was initially hesitant to embrace Blockchain 
Technology in its financial markets, but the exploration of Blockchain 
for use by Nasdaq, the New York Stock Exchange, and even other 
countries’ implementation of the technology into exchanges is 
encouraging for its potential share tracing use for perfecting appraisal 
rights in the near-future.166 For all of the exchanges that have already 
 
161 Id.  
162 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(a).  
163 Id.  
164 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(a)(1) (2019). 
165 See supra text accompanying notes 59–70. 
166 Eric Ervin, Blockchain Technology Set to Revolutionize Global Stock Trading, 
FORBES (Aug. 16, 2018), 
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effectuated—or are currently experimenting with effectuating—the 
technology, one component of Blockchain’s revolutionary usefulness 
seems to stand out from all else: efficiency.167 This degree of 
efficiency is precisely what could rectify the issue that currently exists 
with tracing the activity of each share within the fungible bunk of 
shares, held by record shareholders on behalf of beneficial 
shareholders, in appraisal actions.  
In order to comprehend why Blockchain can be used safely, 
securely, and efficiently, a common misconception about Blockchain 
must first be clarified. Given the nascence and complexity of 
Blockchain, one consumer misapprehension that exists about 
Blockchain is that the technology is immutable, but that it subsists on 
a publicly accessible database.168 However, the technology consists of 
both public and private Blockchains.169 The difference between private 
and public Blockchains is simple—private Blockchains can selectively 
filter the participants that can access a particular network, while public 
Blockchains’ intent is to be publicly accessible.170 Nasdaq was among 
the first exchanges, both domestically and internationally, to actively 
utilize Blockchain technology for a client.171 Private Blockchain was 
used by Nasdaq for client, Chain.com (“Chain”), to unveil Nasdaq’s 
own Blockchain ledger technology, Nasdaq Linq, which enabled 
Nasdaq to electronically document its issuance of shares to Chain, a 
private investor.172  
A concern about Blockchain technology that persists, particularly 
in the financial and banking industries, which consist of entities that 
possess and communicate highly-sensitive information, such as social 
security numbers attached to bank and trading accounts on a daily 
 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericervin/2018/08/16/blockchain-technology-set-to-
revolutionize-global-stock-trading/#32daa6ce4e56.  
167 Id.  
168 Jordan French, NASDAQ is “All-In” on Blockchain Technology, STREET (Apr. 
23, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/nasdaq-all-in-on-blockchain-
technology-14551134.  
169 Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public and Private Blockchain, 
IBM (May 31, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/05/the-
difference-between-public-and-private-blockchain.  
170 Id. 
171 Prableen Bajpai, How Stock Exchanges are Experimenting with Blockchain 
Technology, NASDAQ (June 12, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/how-stock-
exchanges-are-experimenting-with-blockchain-technology-cm801802.  
172 NASDAQ Linq Enables First Ever Private Securities Issuance, NASDAQ (Dec. 
30, 2015), http://ir.nasdaq.com/news-releases/news-release-details/nasdaq-linq-
enables-first-ever-private-securities-issuance?releaseid=948326.  
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basis, is the transparency that Blockchain promotes.173 The primary 
advantage of Nasdaq Linq for private companies is that it is incredibly 
efficient in comparison to the non-Blockchain ledger systems.174 For 
example, the use of Nasdaq Linq for Chain “enabled the issuer to 
digitally represent a record of ownership using Nasdaq Linq, while 
significantly reducing settlement time and eliminating the need for 
paper stock certificates.”175 
It must be noted, however, that Nasdaq Linq, in its current form, is 
not a distributed ledger.176 However, what is incredibly interesting 
about Nasdaq Linq is that it was built and designed with the underlying 
ability for it to eventually become a distributed ledger.177 The process 
to transform Nasdaq Linq is informative for how Blockchain can be 
translated into use for appraisal actions. Frederik Voss, the Vice 
President of Blockchain Innovation at Nasdaq, explained, in a press 
release, the steps that Nasdaq Linq will need to go through in order to 
become a distributed ledger.178 Voss explained that, in order to become 
a distributed ledger, Nasdaq Linq would not be able to jump “straight 
from one writer to a totally permission-less environment; he suggests 
that the next step would be to transform Linq into a federated solution 
with an agreement as to who is allowed to write transactions to the 
ledger.”179 However, Nasdaq Linq’s ability to become a distributed 
ledger in the future is telling of Blockchain’s ability to make the legal 
system’s problems with appraisal actions much more efficient and less 
opaque, which would consequently filter out non-viable perfections of 
appraisal rights.  
While Nasdaq’s Linq technology is certainly compelling evidence 
that Blockchain could be effectively used to trace shares with regard 
to appraisal actions, Nasdaq has embarked on an even more promising 
application of Blockchain, that is far less attenuated than Linq, to serve 
the share tracing purpose.180 As mentioned above, when appraisal 
arbitrageurs seek to perfect appraisal rights, they need not show the 
 
173 Building on the Blockchain, NASDAQ (Mar. 23, 2016, 5:31 PM), 
https://business.nasdaq.com/marketinsite/2016/Building-on-the-Blockchain.html.  
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 Id.  
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
180 NASDAQ to Deliver Blockchain E-Voting Solution to Strate, NASDAQ (Nov. 22, 
2017), http://ir.nasdaq.com/news-releases/news-release-details/nasdaq-deliver-
blockchain-e-voting-solution-strate.  
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voting status of each individual share held by the record holder of 
fungible bulk of shares; rather, the beneficial owner—the 
arbitrageur—needs only show that the record holder of shares holds 
enough shares that voted against the merger to account for the total 
number of shares for which the arbitrageur seeks appraisal.181  
These votes, however, are primarily conducted through proxies, in 
which record holders of shares, such as Cede & Co., will vote the 
fungible bulk of shares held on behalf of the beneficial owners, 
according to beneficial owners’ instructions as to which of the three 
voting options the beneficial owners instruct the record holder to 
execute.182 One of the issues that inherently exists for the present state 
of proxy voting for mergers is that, when the deal appears, in all 
aspects, to be fair to the selling firm’s shareholders, the shareholders 
will often abstain from voting on the merger, which consequently 
provides for more shares held in the fungible bulk by the record 
shareholder to allow the arbitrageurs to perfect appraisal on account of 
those shares, without any concrete evidence as to the vote status of 
each of those shares.   
In 2017, however, Nasdaq issued a press release that disclosed its 
new initiative to use Blockchain Technology to deliver e-voting 
solutions to Strate, which is South Africa’s Central Securities 
Depository.183 The Nasdaq press release expressly indicated that the 
primary purpose of the agreement with Strate was to “leverage the 
solution to improve voting efficiencies and increase shareholder 
participation in South Africa.”184 This was not a speculative first 
attempt by Nasdaq to implement a Blockchain solution to bring e-
voting to foreign capital markets; in fact, Strate was compelled to reach 
this agreement with Nasdaq because Nasdaq had already implemented 
a similar Blockchain solution into its own market in Estonia.185 The 
“Proof of Concept” in Estonia, that convinced Strate to enter into the 
agreement with Nasdaq, was spurred because investors often do not 
have direct control over their votes, especially when the votes are cast 
 
181 In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc, No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 
1378345, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
182 Id.  
183 See NASDAQ to Deliver, supra note 180; see also STRATE, 
https://www.strate.co.za/about/our-company (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).  
184 NASDAQ to Deliver, supra note 180. 
185 Is Blockchain the Answer to E-Voting? NASDAQ Believes So, NASDAQ (Jan. 23, 
2017), https://business.nasdaq.com/marketinsite/2017/Is-Blockchain-the-Answer-
to-E-voting-Nasdaq-Believes-So.html.  
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through proxies.186 Moreover, the Blockchain solution was intended to 
enable investors to have easier access to their voting history.187 The e-
voting project in Estonia rendered great early success and served as a 
tangible display of Blockchain’s great potential for use in other capital 
markets, such as Strate for South Africa.188 
With regard to the Strate initiative in South Africa, the stated 
purpose of the initiative by Strate is to provide an “end-to-end” 
interface for investors that hold shares in listed companies.189 The 
“end-to-end” component of the Blockchain solution indicates Strate’s 
desire to implement an all-in-one system that allows investors in listed 
companies to manage their shares “from notification and material 
distribution to voting management and reporting at the general 
meeting.”190 Among the major advantages of such a user interface is 
that it “improves efficiency and transparency” because “leveraging 
blockchain” enables Nasdaq and Strate to “reduce friction in the voting 
and proxy assignment process and also ensure that all information is 
transparent to stakeholders when required and with the proper security, 
governance and risk procedures in place.”191  
Although the initiatives by Nasdaq in both Estonia and South 
Africa are indicative of the growing receptiveness about Blockchain 
Technology as a tool to use to improve efficiency and transparency 
within markets, one country with a large equity market, more so than 
all others, has pioneered active use of Blockchain Technology in its 
largest exchange: Australia.192 The Australian Stock (“ASX”) has 
always taken an aggressive stance to be at the forefront of 
implementing technology to streamline its capital market interface.193 
Over a quarter of a century ago, ASX developed Clearing House 
 
186 Id.  
187 Id.  
188 Id. (“The Estonia e-voting project was an opportunity to use the blockchain’s 
immutable transaction ledger technology in a different way. The system uses the 
blockchain in the traditional way to record the ownership of securities as reported 
by the CSD. Based on those holdings, the system also issues voting right assets and 
voting token assets for each shareholder. A user may spend voting tokens to cast 
their votes on each meeting agenda item if they also own the voting right asset. 
This model successfully demonstrated how a blockchain could be used for 
something other than transaction settlement.”).  
189 NASDAQ to Deliver, supra note 180. 
190 Id.  
191 Id.  
192 Chess Replacement, ASX, https://www.asx.com.au/services/chess-
replacement.htm#DistributedLedgerTechnologysolution (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
193 Id.  
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Electronic Subregister System (“CHESS”), which “enabled the 
successful [dematerialization] of the cash equity market (the 
conversion of physical shares into an electronic format).”194  
However, in a 2018 press release, ASX announced that it would be 
replacing CHESS with a distributed ledger as the “post-trade 
infrastructure for Australia’s equity market.”195 The main objectives of 
ASX’s DLT replacement of CHESS, due for effectuation beginning in 
2020, are to operate for the benefit of issuers and investors, provide 
greater accessibility, make information more transparent and 
accessible, and to generate greater efficiency, while simultaneously 
creating a more private and secure system that will reduce exposure to 
new risks that would result from the corruption of, or fraudulent 
interference with, information on the system.196 This is yet another 
pristine example of why DLT can and should be implemented as an 
infrastructure that can accurately and transparently trace the voting 
status of shares for the purpose of appraisal actions. 
The most important feature of Blockchain for the share tracing 
issues in appraisal actions—aside from the proven successes that 
Blockchain has already seen in foreign exchanges and for domestic 
use—is that the technology has been recognized by notable figures 
involved in Delaware appraisal litigation. Most notably, Vice 
Chancellor, Justice Travis Laster, of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
delivered a speech titled, “The Blockchain Plunger: Using Technology 
to Clean Up Proxy Plumbing and Take Back the Vote.”197 The 
promotion of the Blockchain by a Vice Chancellor on the Court of 
Chancery is an extremely positive indicator for its implementation into 
the legal system. Even more corroborative of such implementation, as 
mentioned above, is the fact that the Delaware legislature has already 
displayed its willingness to adopt Blockchain into Delaware General 
Corporate Law with its 2016 enactment of the Delaware Blockchain 
 
194 Id.  
195 Media Release, ASX, ASX Outlines New Features and Timetable for DLT 
System to Replace CHESS (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-news/asx-chess-replacement-scope-and-
implementation-plan.pdf.   
196 Chess Replacement, supra note 192. 
197 Andrea Tinianow, When it Comes to Adopting Blockchain Technology, 
Education Leads to Utilization, FORBES (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andreatinianow/2018/06/20/when-it-comes-to-
adopting-blockchain-technology-education-leads-to-utilization/#2610dc3e4ea8.  
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Initiative.198 Notably, Delaware was the first jurisdiction globally to 
officially integrate Blockchain into its legal system.199  
Blockchain is certainly a new and relatively unknown realm of 
technology.200 Although Blockchain technology has proven effective 
in a multitude of uses, there still remain those who are skeptical and, 
perhaps, afraid of the use of Blockchain. Consequently, it has raised 
the eyebrows of many as to its security and safety; regardless of its 
purported high-level security, the recurring question that arises is, 
“how secure is Blockchain Technology?”201 Big Banks in the United 
States, in particular, have been highly skeptical of Blockchain.202 
However, an important distinction between Blockchain, DLT itself, 
and Cryptocurrencies’ use of Blockchain underlies this skepticism—
Big Banks find Blockchain’s use in Cryptocurrency markets, not 
Blockchain in the broad scope of DLT, to be dubious.203 In fact, 
Citigroup, among other Big Banks that effected policies that explicitly 
restricted clients from engaging in the purchase of Cryptocurrency on 
personal and business credit cards, has begun to conduct trials with 
Blockchain’s ledger technology for transmission of the Bank’s 
sensitive materials.204   
Blockchain is no longer a theoretical concept, nor is it just a 
popular buzzword within social media spheres. It is a very real 
 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 56–61. See previous comments. 
199 Tinianow, supra note 197. 
200 Bernard Marr, A Very Brief History of Blockchain Technology Everyone Should 
Read, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/16/a-very-brief-history-of-
blockchain-technology-everyone-should-read/#6063d1177bc4. Blockchain was 
first used by the public in 2009. Id.  
201 Andrew Gazdecki, How Secure is Blockchain Technology?, FORBES (Oct. 12, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/10/12/how-secure-is-
blockchain-technology/#2c832afd72f0.  
202 Jennifer Surane & Laura J Keller, Bitcoin Ban Expands Across Credit Cards as 
Big U.S. Banks Recoil, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-02/bofa-to-decline-all-
cryptocurrency-transactions-on-credit-cards (“In February, 2018, several U.S. Big 
Banks implanted new policies that prohibited the purchase of Cryptocurrencies on 
personal and business credit cards. The Banks that effected this ban on their clients 
were, among others, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., and 
Citigroup, A likely reason for such a policy is that the banks, operating in 
centralized markets, do not want to deal with the risk associated with lending to 
clients that bet incorrectly and are subsequently incapable of paying off their credit 
debt.”).  
203 Id.  
204 Lucinda Shen, Banking Giants Including Citigroup and Barclays Sign Up for a 
Trial Blockchain Project, FORTUNE (July 30, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/2018/07/30/blockchain-barclays-citi-app-store-ledgerconnect.  
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technology with a developing, but advanced, technological capacity. 
As Blockchain becomes increasingly perceived as more than a mere 
Cryptocurrency database, it will presumably experience 
implementation into larger-scale systems to perform multitudes of 
ledger-based functions. One such potential function, which is certainly 
within the realm of possibility, would be to enforce an eventually 
codified share-tracing requirement in section 262. If so, appraisal 
arbitrageurs’ strategies may have to be completely reevaluated.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The genesis of arbitrageurs’ adventitious anti-martingale betting 
strategy upon its pari-mutuel lock on Delaware’s appraisal statute may 
come to an equally anticipated cease. Delaware courts’ recent 
appraisal jurisprudence lends support to the notion that the Court of 
Chancery no longer has free-reign to value deals, from upon its 
chancellors’ disinterested throne. Withal, the evolving uses of DLT 
may, and should, cause the Delaware legislature to excogitate its 
codification into section 262. Combined, codification of a DLT-
galvanized share-tracing requirement and recent Delaware courts’ 
precedentially antithetical appraisal decisions could, theoretically, 
desiccate arbitrageurs’ once-bottomless pool of gains, derived from 
valuation judgments well in excess of deal price.   
In 2007, the amendments to section 262 and the Court of 
Chancery’s jurisprudence unequivocally enabled arbitrageurs to profit 
from the appraisal statute; however, the appraisal statute functionally 
serves the significant purpose of allowing record holders of stock, on 
behalf of beneficial owners, to non-frivolously seek appraisal for per-
share undervaluation offered as the deal price. The social value of the 
statute is to protect minority shareholders’ shares, for which appraisal 
is sought, from being disgorged of substantial economic and intrinsic 
value derived from long-term investments with a particular firm. 
Conceptually, this makes sense, as a system that forces dissenting 
minority shareholders of the dissolving firm to accept shares, which 
they presumably would have purchased had they desired to, from the 
surviving firm is contrary to free market principles. 
Conversely, from the perspective of arbitrageurs, the actual 
fairness of a given deal is of purely objective, rather than subjective, 
value; that is, there is no intrinsic value attached to the shares for 
arbitrageurs—appraisal arbitrageurs do not hold stock long-term in a 
target firm prior to the record date of a merger. Instead, the arbitrageurs 
are only concerned with asserting appraisal rights in order to receive 
short-term gain from a per-share valuation higher than that offered by 
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the acquiring firm as the deal price. The pari-mutuel lock drove 
appraisal arbitrage and generated massive sums of money from the 
method. Obviously, if the arbitrageurs purchased the shares and did 
not assert appraisal rights, then they would just be making an ordinary 
investment; no arbitrage would take place, as this would connote that 
the arbitrageurs are either purchasing stock with intent of having long-
term investment with the surviving firm, or, illogically, that the 
arbitrageurs are willing to accept the deal price, which would provide 
no gain at all.  
Arbitrageurs were willing to accept the risk associated with 
bringing appraisal actions under the appraisal statute, so long as the 
short-term gains derived from the sale of capital assets outweighed the 
costs of purchasing and litigating the per-share fair value of such 
assets. However, the decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court have 
cast an ominous shadow over the future of appraisal arbitrage. 
Moreover, technological advancements within the realm of 
Blockchain technology has spurred securities exchanges and financial 
titans around the globe to utilize its powerful distributed ledger 
capabilities. Thus, the synthesized effect of the Delaware courts’ 
recent appraisals of fair value below, or at, deal price and the 
auspicious future of Blockchain as a share-tracing mechanism could 
soon bring an end to arbitrageurs’ longstanding pari-mutuel lock on 
the Delaware appraisal statute.   
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